such as the faint inner sounds of shabd yoga or pseudonirvanic bliss of Buddhist vipassana meditation Goleman) . Then too there are unitive states in which the s ration between self and world dissolves such as in some Zen satoris (Kapleau:281) ; there are others in which all objects or phenomena disappear such as in the Buddhist nirvana or Vendantic nirvikalpa samadhi; and there are states in which all phenomena are perceived as expressions or modifications of consciousness, e.g., sahaj samadhi (Wil ber 1980:74; Free John: 589) . Of course this is not to deny that certai states may display significant functional and experiential commonalitie Asian meditative and yogic states are now recognized as distinc states sui generis that may exhibit a variety of unique phenomenologica perceptual, electrophysiological, and hormonal changes (Shapiro: Sha- piro & Walsh ; Wilber, Engler & Brown; Goleman) . Until recently however, these Asian meditative and yogic states were often regarded a pathological, and their practitioners were regarded as neurotic or psychotic (Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry). Thus one text book of psychiatry concluded that
The obvious similarities between schizophrenic regressions and the practices of yoga and Zen merely indicate that the general trend in oriental cultures is to withdraw into the self from an overbearingly difficult physical and social reality. (Alexander and Selesnich:457) The reasons for this long history of the conflation and pathologizin of religious states are probably several. These include a general bia against accepting the very existence of certain altered states; witness th nineteenth century surgeons who observed apparently painless amputa tions performed under hypnosis and concluded that the subjects had been bribed to pretend they felt no pain (Tart 1986) . Related to this i the limited range of Western categories for states other than waking sleeping, and pathological ones. This dovetails with the widel observed bias in clinical psychiatry and psychology to pathologize unusual experiences (Jung:xlii; Maslow:5; Noll, 1983:444) . This can be particularly important in cross cultural studies because "anthropologist sometimes fail to distinguish clinic and culture" (Opler:1092) . Related to this is what Michael Hamer (1982:XVII) calls "cognicentrism," th tendency to assume that one's own usual state is optimal. Finally, mo researchers have had little direct experience of the states they investigate.
Yet classical descriptions, psychological and philosophical argumen (Tart 1983b; Walsh 1989d) , and personal reports by Western traine researchers who have experienced altered states (e.g. Globus; Hame 1982; Tart 1986; Ram Dass 1990) suggest that it may be difficult t comprehend fully and differentiate alternate s ence of them.
However a number of phenomenologica physiological, chemical, and theoretical com nificant differences between meditative-yog logical disturbances, including schizoph Walsh 1980; Wilber 1983; Wilber, Engler, a hundred studies now attest to potential the practices (Shapiro; Shapiro and Walsh; M Ken Wilber (1980:78) concluded, meditative cal states "can be seriously equated only inquiry goes no further than superficial im So Western academic evaluations of the alternate states of consciousness induced by Asian meditative and yogic disciplines ha undergone a marked shift. Many initial evaluations assumed that the were pathological and regressive whereas more recent assessments ha acknowledged their uniqueness and potential benefits. The purpose of this paper is 1) to examine whether a similar reevaluation may appropriate for another tradition for which altered states appear to central, namely shamanism, 2) to employ a new approach that allows more precise, multidimensional description, mapping, and compariso of states of consciousness, 3) to map shamanic states, and 4) then compare shamanistic states with other states with which some autho have claimed they are identical.
DEFINING SHAMANISM
Shamanism is now going through a period of surprising p in the West, and shamanic workshops and books are multiply idly. At the same time there is a growing appreciation of the of alternate states of consciousness in shamanism. Indeed the d of shamanism seems to be changing to reflect this appreciati Early definitions of shamanism focussed on the shaman's a contact and control "spirits." Thus Shirokogoroff (269) claimed term shaman refers to "persons of both sexes who have master who at their will can introduce these spirits into themselves their power over the spirits in their own interests, particular other people, who suffer from the spirits." However, contemporary anthropologists seem less impress importance of spirits than by the altered states in which they ienced, and definitions seem to have shifted accordingly t these states (Walsh 1990:9) . Within this definitional class broad and narrow definitions. Broad definitions such as those and Price-Williams (1980:408) stipulate that the "only definin bute is that the specialist enter into a controlled ASC on beh community." Narrow definitions stipulate a specific category most often states in which shamanic journeying or soul flig (Eliade 1964:5; Noll 1983:444; Walsh 1989a Walsh :4, 1990 , and Hamer (1982:xvi) has attempted to describe and define shama terms of a single specific state.
The definition used here is a narrow one which describes sh ism as a family of traditions whose practitioners focus on v entering altered states of consciousness in which they experie selves, or their spirit(s), traveling to other realms at will and i with other entities in order to serve their communities. While definition will satisfy all researchers, this one has several ad First, it describes a group of practitioners that almost all re would view as shamans. Second, because of its specificity and ness, the definition is able to differentiate this tradition from ot tions and practices, e.g., mediums, priests, and medicine men, from various psychopathologies, with which shamanism has fused (Walsh 1990a ).
Shamanic Experiences
Interpretations While there is now greater interest in shamanic ASCs and ning appreciation that they may be specific, it is still common in both anthropology and psychology that shamanic states an who experience them are pathological (Kakar; Noll 1983) . In "experience of the shaman has been likened to almost every claims that "shamans, yogis and Buddhists state of consciousness." There seem to be serious deficiencies with these comparisons.
Almost universally they appear to be based on gross similarities rather than on careful phenomenological mapping and comparison (Walsh 1990) .
One significant and important exception is the work of Richard Noll (1983) . Noll did a careful phenomenological comparison between shamanic journey states as described in the traditional literature and the states of schizophrenics as documented in the American Psychiatric Association's (1980) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Noll was able to demonstrate, contrary to decades of assumptions, that there are clear phenomenological differences between schizophrenic and shamanic experiences and that the two could not be regarded as identical.
For example, Noll demonstrated major differences on the dimension of control. He pointed out that shamans are generally able to induce and terminate their ASCs at will and modulate their experiences to some extent, while schizophrenics are almost entirely helpless victims of their states and experiences. As will be shown later, comparisons on several other phenomenological dimensions also demonstrate significant differences.
Of course it must be noted that Noll focused on shamanic journey states and not on the earlier life period of the shamanic initial call, which may sometimes constitute a major life crisis with considerable bizarre behavior (Eliade 1964; Grof and Grof 1989) . Consequently, Noll's data does not fully rule out the possibility that shamans may once have been disturbed or even schizophrenic but subsequently recover.
To Noll's comparisons can be added several other observations. The first is that the clinical picture of the initial crisis suggests significant differences from schizophrenia (Grof and Grof 1986, 1989; Walsh 1990) . The second is that the shaman is said to function often as one of the most effective members of the tribe, displaying superior energy, concentration, memory, knowledge, and leadership (Eliade, 1964; Hamer, 1982; Reichel-Dolmatoff; Rogers) , qualities that are hardly consistent with the chronic deterioration common in schizophrenia. Taken together, these facts constitute a strong argument against the facile equation of shamanism and schizophrenia.
Noll's work points to new possibilities and standards for diagnostic and comparative assessment of shamanic states. Henceforth it will no longer be adequate simply to conclude on the basis of superficial simi-larities that shamanic states of consciousness are equivalent t states, such as those found either in various forms of patho other traditions such as Buddhism or yoga. Rather what will sary is a careful multidimensional mapping of shamanic stat sciousness and then an equally careful multidimensional com these states with those of other populations. After all, as Hus (1987:558) pointed out: "Claims for similarities or differe their wheels until they get down to ways and degrees in wh differ or are alike."
This article aims to expand Noll's work by providing a mor (yet still preliminary), multidimensional, phenomenological m manic states of consciousness and comparing this with the p states of schizophrenia and with the meditative states of Budd yoga. It will become apparent that all these states show signif ferences and that equating them can no longer be justified. H each type must be regarded as a distinct class of states which multiple significant dimensions.
The Varieties of Shamanic States of Consciousness
In making these comparisons it is important to acknowledge that there is not one but many states of consciousness that are invariably sought and used in shamanism. Shamans may induce altered states by a variety of means including fasting, solitude, dancing, drumming, and drugs (Harner 1973 (Harner , 1982 Dobkin de Rios and Winkleman; Walsh 1989b) . Major classes of shamanic altered states include possession, drug, and journey states. Shamanic possession-states refer to states in which the shaman's consciousness is experienced as being taken over to varying degrees by an ego-alien entity, usually believed to be a spirit. (Peters and Price-Williams 1980; Walsh 1990) .
Drug states encompass a remarkably wide variety of states (Grof 1980 (Grof , 1988  for their relationship to shamanism see Hamer 1973; for the relationship of drug states to non-drug induced religious states see Smith 1964 ; and for a theoretical explanation of this relationship see Walsh 1990 ). This is not to deny that there may be significant overlap or functional equivalence between some of these states (Peters) but rather that there seems no reason to assume a single shamanic state. This paper focuses on mapping the states occurring during the shamanic journey. The journey has been chosen because it is one of the key, some would say one of the defining, characteristics of shamanism (Eliade 1964; Hamer 1982; Noll 1983) . In addition we have many descriptions of it and the intense imagery been confused with schizophrenic halluci Even here to say that there is only a sin may be an oversimplification. As anyone manic journeys knows, one's state may vary journey, and there are probably signifi between practitioners. This is not to deny t among these states and experiences. How considerable variation may occur and that ev consciousness" is an arbitrary and static cry ing experience, a multidimensional dynamic sake of simplicity in this paper I will somet state of consciousness" to refer to shamani
NATURE OF THE SHAMANIC JOUR

CONSCIOUSNESS Trance States
The shamanic state of consciousness during journeys is often spoken of as a trance. The term trance seems to be widely used but imprecisely defined. Indeed, it is usually so imprecisely defined that some research ers try to avoid it "partly because it carries negative connotations, part because it has never been clearly enough defined" (Tart 1986:70) . I seems to have been used broadly to cover all waking ASCs and mor narrowly to indicate an ASC marked by focused attention (Peters and Price-Williams 1983; Winkleman). I use the term only in this latt sense.
Definitions of focused attention trances tend to inc engagement in an inner world accompanied by redu and responsiveness to, the environment (Patt Hurd:286) . This is probably useful as a first step, but definition and differentiation of trance states can b further. The following is an initial attempt to begi I would suggest that the key defining characterist focusing of attention with reduced awareness of the (objects, stimuli, or environment outside this focus constricted attention may be either internal or e internal then there is the possibility of rich, intense including journeys of the shamanic type. Of cou argue for the objective reality of their realms and experie that they are merely images (Hamer 1982; .
Assuming that the shamanic state of consciousness trance, can we go further and ask "what type of tran words, to what extent can we differentiate and map trance ous maps of states of consciousness have been proposed fo Ancient Asian systems include the Buddhist Abhidharma (Nyanaponika) and yogic chakra systems (Tart 1983a) . Recent Western suggestions include maps based on systems theory (Tart 1983b) , the level of arousal (Fischer) , inducing variables (Ludwig) , developmental stages (Wilber 1980) , and phenomenological dimensions (Clark) . None of these maps appear fully appropriate to the purposes of this paper. The phenomenological dimensions examined here are based on the frequency with which these dimensions are described and the importance they are accorded in descriptions of the states to be considered. Based on these criteria the following dimensions seem particularly relevant.
Key Dimensions for Mapping Altered States 1. Degree of reduction of awareness of the experiential context or environment: ranging from complete to minimal or none 2. Ability to communicate 3. Concentration: important factors here include: a. The degree of concentration and b. Whether the attention is fixed immovably on a single object (e.g., Buddhist jhanas or yogic samadhi states) or momentary or fluid, where attention is allowed to shift between selected objects (e.g., in shamanic journeys) 4. Degree of control.
Here there are two important types of control:
a. Ability to enter and leave the ASC at will b. Ability to control the content of experience while in the ASC 5. Degree of arousal 6. Degree of calm. This refers to more than low arousal, which refers simply to the level of activation, since calm also implies low levels of agitation and distractibility (Nyanoponika Thera). 7. Sensitivity or subtlety of sensory perception. This may be either reduced, as in hypnotic anesthesia, or enhanced, as in Buddhist insight meditation. 8. Nature of the sense of self or identity 9. Affect: especially whether the experience is pleasurable or painful ASCs emerge in a fixed sequence of stages, e.g., the formles samadhi states of yoga emerge after earlier stages in which attention is focussed on specific images (Wilber 1980; Wilber et al.) There does not seem to be clear evidence in the literature of a distinct developmental progression of states in shamanism, and so this dimension is not discussed further in this paper.
These parameters are obviously broad and preliminary and compared to the exquisite subtleties of the Buddhist Abhidharma are relatively insensitive. Doubtless they will be refined by further research. Yet even at this stage they allow significantly more sensitive phenomenological comparisons than have been the norm. In addition, the very breadth of these etic categories may confer significant advantages inasmuch as they should easily encompass the relevant emic descriptions from diverse populations.
MAPPING SHAMANIC JOURNEY STATES
With this preliminary delineation of important experiential dimensions of ASCs we can now turn attention specifically to the shamanic journey state and its attendant experiences. The following description of the state is based on three sources. The first is the description of jour-neys in the literature (e.g. Shirokogoroff; Eliade 1964; Ham 1983; Peters and Price-Williams 1980) . The second is inter native Balinese and Basque practitioners and with Western undergone intensive long-term (minimum one year) sham ticeship and training in native South American, Huichol, traditions. Understanding these descriptions was facilitat source of information, namely, several years' personal ex shamanic journeys. Training for these was obtained primar tutelage of Michael Hamer, formerly a professor of anthro New School for Social Research, who has synthesized his lif of, and study with, shamanic practitioners from diverse courses on what he calls "core shamanism," which focus s on shamanic journeying. I mention the personal experi there is growing evidence that, due to state-specific leam standing of alternate states may be significantly enhance experience of them (Tart 1983a,b) . Space limitations ob clude giving detailed accounts of the many individual journ from these several sources, some of which are already ava literature, but the general profiles are as follows.
The shamanic journey is always undertaken for a speci such as to obtain information or power with which to sol afflicting someone in the tribe. The shaman first enters an with the assistance of practices such as preparatory fasting vation, and ritual, followed by aids such as drumming, da singing. Once established in the ASC the shaman experien ing from the body, largely losing awareness of the body ment, and traveling as a free soul or free spirit, to one of the of the shamanic cosmology-the upper, middle, or lower shaman's attention is fixed on the appropriate world, whi ienced vividly in multiple sensory modalities, i.e., visual, a tile, etc. In this world the shaman may first call his or h spirits (spirit helpers, power animals) for assistance. The roams at will in search of a source of relevant informatio experiencing a wide range of emotions depending on the sp iences that occur, and having found the source attempts information or power back. Reentering the body the shama the ASC and communicates the information or transmits the persons in need, perhaps prescribing a particular medi or course of action intended to alleviate the problem for w ney was undertaken. With this general outline of the jou now map the shamanic journey state on ou follows.
The shamanic journey state is usually one the environment. That this reduction may b the fact that some shamans communicate w journeys (Peters and Price-Williams 1980 Concentration is said to be increased. This concentration is momentary rather than fixed since the shaman's attention moves fr from object to object.
Shamans usually maintain good control of the state. They are usu ally able to enter and leave the ASC at will and also able to partly det mine the type of imagery and experiences. This partial control experience is similar to that described in lucid dreaming states (dre ing in which one recognizes that one is dreaming) (La Berge) and to number of psychotherapeutic visualization techniques. These tec niques include guided imagery, guided meditation, "waking dream Jungian active imagination, and a variety of other visualization strate (Noll 1983; Walsh 1989c Walsh , 1990 .
Shamans may be moderately aroused and agitated during their jou neys. This is hardly surprising since they may experience themselv traversing strange worlds, placating angry gods, and battling fears spirits. Calm is not a word that would usually be applied to shamans journeys. Their affect is variable, depending on the types of experien they undergo.
Shamans usually continue to experience themselves during journeys as separate individuals but now as "souls" or "spirits," freed from the body. As such they feel able to travel through or between worlds, to see and interact with other spirits, and to intercede with these spirits on behalf of their people. The shamanic journey therefore bears similarities to the out-of-body experiences described throughout the world in spontaneous, learned, lucid dream, or near-death experiences (Monroe; Moody 1975 Moody , 1988 Ring 1980 Ring , 1984 Ring , 1986 Irwin) . It may be that spontaneous out-of-body experiences such as these provided the inspiration for their voluntary mastery and incorporation into a set of practices and rituals that became the basis for the tradition of shamanism (Walsh 1989c (Walsh , 1990 . Similar journey experience may also occur in other traditions, including Taoism, Islam, yoga, and Tibetan Buddhism, although the journey is not as central a practice as in shamanism (Evans-Wentz; Siegel and Hirschman; Baldrian) . All this is not to imply that these experiences necessarily involve a separation of consciousness from the body. Though this is indeed the interpretation of shamans, most West-em researchers, but not all, would regard them as imagina truly exosomatic.
The experiential content of the shamanic journey is co coherent. The images or phenomena encountered are rem multimodal (e.g., visual and auditory), highly structured, consistent with the shaman's learned cosmology and the pu specific session, and under partial voluntary control.
COMPARATIVE MAPPING
Until now comparisons between different states of conscious such as between those of shamanism and schizophrenia, have rather superficial. All too often people have simply concluded, o basis of very imprecise comparisons, that these states were identi that they were different. Multidimensional phenomenological m allows us to move beyond such simple claims, to compare s dimensions of experience, and to say on which dimensions states similar and on which they differ. In short, this approach allows move from unidimensional to multidimensional comparisons compare more sensitively and distinguish between states.
We can now use this approach to compare shamanic states those that occur in other conditions. Since it has been claimed t shamanic states are the same as those of schizophrenia, Buddhism yoga, let us map these states on the dimensions of experience th have used to map shamanic states and then compare them.
Schizophrenic States
Many people who claim that shamans are schizophrenic an shamanic and schizophrenic states are equivalent seem to assume there is only one shamanic altered state and one schizophrenic s Yet we have already seen that there are probably multiple sh states and the same is certainly true of schizophrenia (American atric Association). To simplify things I will focus here on the stat occurs in an acute schizophrenic episode, since this has probably most often confused with shamanic experiences.
An acute schizophrenic episode can be one of the most devast experiences any human being can undergo. Psychological disorga tion is extreme and disrupts affect, cognition, perception, and id Though there are significant variations within and between indiv we can map the acute schizophrenic episode dimensions and compare it to the shamanic Control is almost entirely lost. The victim episode has little ability to halt the proc Awareness of the environment may be redu occupied with hallucinations, and cognition the person may be unable to communicate.
reduced, and the patient is usually highl experience is usually extremely unpleasant, often distorted.
The schizophrenic's experience is usuall incoherent. This disorganization extends ev and schizophrenics may consequently feel t dying, and losing the ability to discriminate This may occasionally result in a sense of be in these circumstances is called autoscopy, and uncontrolled (American Psychiatric A Sadock:757). 
Comparisons of Shamanic and Schizophrenic States
Once both the shamanic journey and acute schizophrenic states have been mapped on these dimensions, it is relatively easy to compare them. Table I reveals that they differ significantly on several important dimensions including concentration, control, sense of identity, affect, and content. This comparison makes clear that there are major differences between the states of consciousness found in shamanic journeys and in acute schizophrenia.
The other shamanic episode that has sometimes been confused with a schizophrenic one is the shamanic initiation crisis. At the time of their initial calling a few shamans-to-be appear to undergo a major life crisis and exhibit a variety of bizarre behaviors (Shirokogoroff; Eliade 1964; Walsh 1990) . These are certainly suggestive of psychopathology and have been given several diagnoses, including schizophrenia.
However, this phase is temporary and usually followed by successful resolution and even exceptional subsequent functioning. It has therefore been suggested that it might be interpreted as an example of a developmental crisis that has been variously called a "creative illness" (Ellenberger) , "regenerative process" (Pelletier and Garfield), "renewal process" (Perry), "metanoic voyage," "visionary state," "mystical expe-rience with psychotic features" (Lukoff), " emergency," "spiritual emergence," and " don; Grof and Grof 1986 . Fo unusual behavior following the initial cal interpretations see Walsh (1990) . It seems m tion crisis can be diagnosed as a schizophre a minority of shamans. It is clearly inappr crisis as a reason to diagnose or dismiss all Social functioning must also be conside and schizophrenics. It will be recalled th standing members of the community, may tual, artistic, and leadership skills, and make their community. Such skills and cont schizophrenics.
Henceforth shamanism and schizophrenia tinct phenomena. Although it is understan sometimes labelled shamans as schizophreni practice is no longer appropriate. Of course sibility that some shamans may be psychol certainly to deny that they are all necessari
Comparisons with Other Traditions
Within recent years there has been a gro shamans with masters of various contempl Buddhism and yoga, and to assume that the the shaman enters are identical to those traditions.
Yet, as we will see, multidimensional m reveal some significant similarities but a between these states. Furthermore, in additi phenomenological comparisons there are sig ments against equivalence. These arguments follows:
1. As was mentioned, there are probably consciousness, e.g., journey, possession, a careful comparison between traditions invo shamanic state and claiming it is identical w traditions. Rather multiple comparisons are 2. Other traditions such as Buddhism an practices and paths. Buddhism, for exam meditation practices (Conze; Goleman) , and there is no ev gest that they induce identical states. In fact, phenomenol suggest major differences between them. For example, th concentrative states, the jhanas, differ dramatically from the central Buddhist vipassana (insight) meditation (Buddhagh the jhanic concentrative states are closer in many wa samadhis (Goleman) , but this is hardly surprising given th originally derived from yogic concentration practices (Nar 3. Yogic and Buddhist practices evolve through apparen series of markedly distinct states and stages, e.g., the ten z pictures and the eight jhanas of Buddhism and the var yogic samadhi (Feuerstein 1989) . Therefore, multiple state even within a single practice.
In summary, claims that shamans and masters of other t equivalent and access identical states will need to make m parisons between multiple states on multiple dimension that simply has not been done. These theoretical argumen several reasons why it is difficult to make sweeping claim between shamanic states and those of other traditions. Of not to deny that there may be some experiential and func between different states inasmuch as they may involve sim and aims, such as attentional training and compassion (Peters) .
These theoretical reservations are supported by data, for when we make direct multidimensional comparisons we find not identity but major differences. Thus, for example, let us make a summary comparison in the accompanying table between the prototypic shamanic journey state and prototypic states that are likely to occur in advanced Buddhist vipassana meditation and advanced yogic practice. This comparison will be aided by a summary presentation of the principles and experiences of classical yogic and Buddhist insight meditations. These descriptions are based on classic texts (e.g., Prabhavananda and Isherwood; Buddhaghosa), recent descriptions (e.g., Goldstein), interviews with advanced Asian and Western practitioners, psychological testing (Shapiro and Walsh; Forte and Dysard 1984a,b; Brown and Engler) , and fifteen years of personal meditative experience (Walsh 1977 (Walsh , 1978 .
Classical yoga is a concentration practice in which the mind is stilled until it can be fixed with unwavering attention on inner experience such as the breath, an image, or a mantra (Eliade 1969; Zimmer; Feuerstein 1989 Feuerstein , 1990 . To do this the yogi withdraws attention from the body and outer world, a technique called pratyahara, to focus inwards "like a tor-toise withdrawing his limbs into his shell." body and outer world is largely lost and tractedly on ever more subtle internal obje away and the yogi experiences samadhi, classical ecstatic mystical union or unio Forman) .
Whereas classical yoga is a concentration meditation is a so-called awareness practice the development of unwavering attention on tation emphasizes fluid attention to all obje Here all stimuli are observed and examined awareness will allow. The aim is to examine and understand the workings of senses, body, and mind as fully as possible, and thereby to cut through the distortions and misunderstandings that usually cloud awareness. "To see things as they are" is the motto of this practice (Buddhaghosa; Goldstein; Goleman). Table I shows that the shamanic journey and yogic and Buddhist states differ on a number of significant dimensions. Perceptual sensitivity to environmental stimuli shows dramatic differences between states. In Buddhist vipassana meditation states both ancient and modem phenomenological reports (Buddhaghosa; Nyanaponika Thera; Walsh 1977 Walsh , 1978 ; Golstein) as well as recent tachistoscopic testing (Brown, Forte and Dysart 1984a,b) suggest that perceptual sensitivity to environmental stimulation can be significantly enhanced. However awareness of the environment is usually somewhat reduced in the shamanic journey and drastically reduced, even to the point of nonawareness, in advanced yogic states (Zimmer; Feuerstein 1989) . Indeed Eliade (1958:78) defined samadhi as "an invulnerable state in which perception of the external world is absent."
These differences in environmental awareness are reflected in differences in communication. Buddhist insight meditators can usually communicate, and shamans can sometimes do so (Peters and Price-Williams 1980) . However, in advanced yogic concentration communication is usually sufficient to break concentration and remove the practitioner from the state (Goleman) .
The types and degree of concentration also vary from tradition to tradition. In contradistinction to schizophrenia, in which concentration is drastically impaired, all three traditions train for increased concentration. Indeed, training attention appears to be a common denominator among consciousness-altering practices (Novak). In shamanism and vipassana meditation, concentration is momentary, since attention moves fluidly from one object to another (Eliade 1964 ; G is in marked contrast to advanced yogic practice, where at and immovable (Eliade 1969; Feuerstein 1989) .
Closely related to concentration is control. Two diffe sions of control should be distinguished. The first is the a and leave the ASC at will, and the second is the ability to experiential content of the ASC. Contrary to schizophren trol is drastically reduced, all three disciplines enhance control. Practitioners are able to enter and leave their resp will although the shaman may require external assis psychoactive drugs or entrancing stimuli such as drumm mans and vipassana meditators are able to exert partia their experiences in the ASC, while yogis in samadhi ha plete control. Indeed, the second line of Patanjali's cla states that "yoga is the control of thought-waves in (Prabhavanada and Isherwood:15) .
There are also significant differences in arousal. Sham ally aroused during their journey and may even dance or agitated. Vipassana meditators, on the other hand, repor tional and arousal lability, which gradually yields to great 1977 , 1978 Goldstein) . Calm may become profound in yo when much of the normal cognitive processing ceases (B 1969; Shapiro and Walsh) . Although I cannot fully agree Fischer's "cartography of nonordinary states" based on le it is interesting to note that he places samadhi at the ex hypoarousal and schizophrenic states near the ex hyperarousal.
The self-sense differs drastically among the three pr shaman usually retains a sense of being a separate indivi now perhaps identified as a soul rather than as a body. H Buddhist meditator's microscopic awareness deconstructs into a flux of evanescent component stimuli. This is the anatta, in which it is recognized that the sense of a perm egoic self is an illusory product of imprecise awareness. T continuous self-sense arises in much the same way as dynamic continuous movie arises from a series of still fra Goleman), a phenomenon known as flicker fusion. Th other hand, may come to realize an unchanging transcen purusha (Eliade 1969; Zimmer) .
The shaman's experience may be either joyous or painfu Buddhist vipassana meditator's. However, in experiences are said to be increasingly bliss The content of the practitioners' experie cally between traditions. The shaman exp imagery consistent with the shamanic worl journey. However, both ancient phenome perceptual testing (Brown and Engler) sugge eventually deconstruct all experiences into What remains is the perception of an evan which arise and pass away with extreme advanced yogi is said to attain "samadhi wi ence of unchanging pure consciousness dev any kind.
Practitioners from the three traditions show significant differences with regard to their experience of the body. Whereas the shaman typically has a controlled out-of-body experience (OOBE) or "ecstasis," the Buddhist vipassana meditator does not. Yogis, on the other hand, may lose awareness of the body due to pratyahara (elimination of sensory input) and experience "enstasis." On this point Eliade, whose theoretical knowledge of both shamanism and yoga was probably as extensive as anyone's, was very clear on the difference between the two: Yoga cannot possibly be confused with shamanism or classed among the techniques of ecstasy. The goal of classic yoga remains perfect autonomy, enstasis, while shamanism is characterized by its desperate effort to attain the 'condition of a spirit,' to accomplish ecstatic flight.
COMMON EXPERIENCES AND CAPACITIES
There is a popular saying that all things are both similar and ent. Having demonstrated significant differences between sham Buddhist, and yogic states, the question naturally arises "in wh are they similar?" Certainly we would expect some similarities three groups of practitioners have undergone long-term intensiv training designed to cultivate religious sensitivity, experien understandings. I will therefore briefly summarize the similarit can be identified on the experiential dimensions we have been u Control All three practitioners have developed the ability to ent desired states of consciousness with relative ease. Of c hardly surprising, since this ability was a criterion for inc study.
Concentration
All three groups of practitioners exhibit heightened concentration.
However the type of concentration, fixed or fluid, is specific to the training and task.
Affect
In the course of their training all three practitioners are almost invariably forced to confront a variety of fearful negative experiences. The general tendency is, as might be expected from psychological principles of implosive therapy, a gradual decrease in the intensity of these negative experiences. In these practices this is followed by a tendency for more pleasant, even ecstatic and blissful, experiences to arise (Elkin; Goldstein; Goleman).
Self-Sense
All three practitioners experience a shift in identity, although there are significant differences in the experiences that induce it and the sense of self that results. However, the common element is a disidentification from the conventional egoic body-bound self-sense.
Content
All three practices induce specific religiously significant experiences. What is remarkable is that these experiences are consistent with the worldview and ontocosmology of the tradition. This suggests that there is an intriguing complementarity between a tradition's worldview and its technology of transcendence such that an effective technology (set of practices) elicits experiences consistent with and supportive of the world-view (Walsh 1991) . Since worldview and expectation can mold experience, there is therefore an interesting question as to what extent technology or worldview is chicken or egg.
IS THERE A COMMON MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE?
One of the major questions that has dominated philosophical sion of mysticism since William James is whether or not there core mystical experience that is common across cultures and tra Walter Stace and some advocates of the perennial philosophy arg no, say "constructivists," such as Steven Katz (1978 Katz ( , 1983 , who a that all experience, including mystical experience, is constructed hence mediated and modified by a variety of conditioned, inesca personal and cultural experiences and filters. Others argue th question remains open (Smith 1987; Rothberg 1989 Rothberg , 1990 . F excellent examination of the epistemological assumptions und Katz's position see Rothberg (1989 Rothberg ( , 1990 . Since the comparisons above clearly indicate significant differences between shamanic, and Buddhist experiences, they would seem to favor the construc and argue against the view that there exists a common my experience.
Yet this may be only part of the story. Although the yogic and Buddhist meditative experiences described above are indeed advanced, they are not the most profound. At the highest reaches of meditation, transcendent experiences of a wholly different kind, radically discontinuous from all that have gone before, are said to occur. These are the samadhi of yoga and the nirvana of Buddhism.
Here description and reason are said to fail: "Not by reasoning is this apprehension attainable" (Katha Upanishad 1,2,4); "words return along with the mind not attaining it" (Taittiriya Upanishad 2,9,1). For these experiences, and the realms they putatively reveal, are said to be beyond space, time, qualities, concepts, and limits of any kind. Hence these experiences are said to be ineffable, indescribable, and inconceivable because they are transempirical, transverbal, and transrational. In the words of the third Zen patriarch Sengstan:
To this ultimate finality no law or description applies....
The more you talk about it
The further astray you wander from the truth.
Here phenomenological description, mapping, and comparison fail, for even to attempt to qualify, let alone map and measure, experiences and domains is said to result invariably in paradox, inasmuch as this is Nicholas de Cusa's "coincidence of opposites," Zen's "not-one, nottwo," and Vedanta's "advaita."
The paradox of attempting to describe the coincidence of opposites is, as Kant was to discover, that the opposite of any appa statement is also valid. Almost fifteen hundred years Nagarjuna-founder of Madhyamaka Buddhism-reached same conclusion, "a conclusion echoed and amplified generations by every major school of Eastern philosophy ogy: Reason cannot grasp the essence of absolute reality, tries, it generates only dualistic incompatibilities" (Wi The primary and liberating task, say both Buddhist and yo is not to describe these states and experiences but rather t for oneself through direct, transrational intuition and its dom, prajna, orjnana.
Are the yogic samadhi and Buddhist nirvana identical, o cisely, are they indistinguishable? It seems that one can not are different, but then one also cannot say they are the sam similarities and differences depend on being able to attrib pare qualities. The answer, at least for yoga and Buddhism, tion of whether there exists a common core mystical expe neither yes nor no but rather, from a Western philosophic "what can be said at all can be said clearly, what we canno we must pass over in silence" (Wittgenstein 1961:3) .
The ineffability of the yogic samadhi and Buddhist nirv answer the questions of whether there exists a mystical ex mon to diverse traditions or whether all mystical experie structed. However, it does suggest that, although many yog and shamanic states can be differentiated by phenomonol ping, there may be some states, perhaps the most profound be mapped or distinguished.
Are Shamans Also Mystics?
And what of shamanism? Do its practitioners also acces states? I have found no references to the unio mystica in and one authority categorically states that in shamanism "w the mystical union with the divinity so typical for the ecstati in the 'higher forms of religious mysticism' " (Hultkrantz However, there are three lines of evidence that suggest t clusion could be incorrect. These are the facts that shaman tradition, that powerful psychedelics may be used, and th ern practitioners report unitive experiences.
Since shamanism is an oral tradition, it is possible that iences may have occurred, at least occasionally, but have subsequent generations and of course theref Without writing there may be no way to pr the highest and rarest flowerings of a tradit Although not an essential part of s psychedelics is common in some areas (Ha huasca, for example, are powerful psych experiences that some researchers regard as Smith 1964; Walsh and Vaughan) .
Finally, Westerners being trained in sham unitive experiences, and I have personall These seemed to be examples of nature my there is the possibility that other types of occur. All of this suggests that, although th of shamanic practices, it may sometimes oc SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS Claims that shamanic states are identical to those of schizo Buddhism, or yoga appear to have been based on imprecise sons and both theory and data argue against their equivalence this confusion reflects a history of imprecise mapping of alte More precise, though still preliminary, multidimensional phe logical mapping and comparisons of altered states are now The maps and comparisons presented here are obviously on steps. However, even at this preliminary stage of development gest that, while shamanic, Buddhist and yogic states show som tional and experiential overlap, they are usually quite distinct show major differences from schizophrenic states. An obvious would be to use one of the psychometric tests now being d such as The Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (P Kumar), to obtain quantitative assessments and compariso phenemonology of these states. Another would be to obt trophysiological measurements of shamanic states to compare measurements already available of schizophrenic and meditati Hopefully further research will enable us to map, compare, a guish these and other states with increasing precision.
